Alcala 1958

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from sen sib le thin gs, wh ich are ma ter ial and int elli gib leonl y in pot enc y. Th e reas on why we must pro cee d in thi s fas hio n is that the hum an min d is the lowest in the orde r of inte llec tual sub­ stance s, par tici pat ing leas t of all in intel­ lect ual power, and con sequen tly is sub­ stanti all y unit ed to a body . Alt hou gh the inte llec tua lpow er is no t the act of a cor por eal orga n, it has a natu ral apt itud e to kno w truth by me ans of abstra ctio n fro m corp oreal and sen sib le thi ngs , wh ich are the leas t knowa blein them selv es beca use of the ir matter. Be cau sethis mode of know ingtruth be fit s the na tur eof the hum an sou l orform wh ich is the ac t of a bod y, it is imp ossible for the sou l, whil e uni ted to the bod y, to know trut h exc ept by mea ns of abs trac tion from phant asm s. But it is imp oss ible to know the quid di ty of imm ater ial sub stan ces thr oug h abst ract ion, bec ause the y are dis­ proportion ateto sen sib lesub stan ces . Ther e­ for e, it is imp ossi ble for the human sou l un ite d to the bod y to app reh end the qu id di ty of the sepa rated sub sta nc es. 16 Con sequ entl y, the separa ted sub stances are stu die dby phi loso phersonl y ins ofa ras the y areage nt pri nci ple s ofall thi ngs . The ir con sid era tionacc ording as the y are th ing s in thems elv esper tain sto the sub jec tma tte r of sac red the ology. Be ing in gen era l can not be the subje ct of any of the par ticu lar sci en ces, fo r the y con sid er be ing , no t ins ofa r as it is be in g, but as a cert ain kin d of b ei n g} 7 He nc e, it mu st per tain to a common sci en ce to con ­ sid er bei ng in gen era l. This sci en ce is me tap hys ics . From this it foll ows tha t me taphy sic s consi de rs firs t pri nci ple s. Si nce me tap hy­ sic s is the sci en ce of be ing as su ch , it cons ide rs firs t pri nci ple s of sci ence , i.e ., pr inc ipl esof demonstra tion . For wh ate ver inh er es in alt bei ng s and not on ly in som e fr i le lligi le o y. r t is i n l t i t l - t c s, ti i ating - l t l , e tly - t tial y . gh t i ll t al r eal , l e t t ction fr r l le , i r t l o ble s l es becau e se t i t · the i is the act of a , it l the soul, while united to the body, to truth except by means of ab traction ta s. i le t i dity ial ces through ab traction, - proportionate to sen ible ub ces. Ther . fore, it i i le l it d t e d iddity nc . 1 ently, te l nces are studied rs they are agent principle of all t . heir i eration a i s in themselves p t i s t f l gy. i l ct of l , consider being, no i g, but a a certain kind ing.17 e, mu t pertain to a com - sider being in ge l. ce rn hy ics. ics i ers iples. hy- i i t ce su , i r i iple , ., i ipl o tion.

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inso far as sen sib le th ings par ticip ated in them. Th e un ive rsa ls cau sed all be ing but wer e als o first and best known, and from them all els e could be ded uce d. "P rin cip le" can be taken in ma ny wa ys. 13 There are pr inc ipl estha t are pri or simply and accord ing to na tur e, and thes e are uni ver sals in caus ati on . The re are oth ers that are pri or by rea son of an orde r to som eth ing ex tri ns ic but yet are of them­ selv es pos terior . Of the se, som e are pri or as to kn ow ledgean d are known as uni ver ­ sal s in pr ed icatio n. Un ive rsa ls in pr ed ica tio n do not con­ stitu te the sub stance of th ing s. 14 It is im­ pos sibl e that an yt hin g that is pre dic ated un ive rsally be a sub sta nce , for the sub ­ stan ce of ea ch is proper to ea ch an d can not inh ere in oth ers . Bu t the un ive rsa l is common to ma ny . Con sequently, it wou ld have to be the sub sta nceof many ,and thi s can not be, for sub sta nce in the sen se of a firs t sub sta nce , e. g. , Soc rat es, ca n nei the r be in nor be said of an yth ing . Si nc e the sep ara ted sub stance s are pri nci ple sof be ing and also nat ure s com­ plet e in thems elv es,th ey can be con sid ere d in two ways: in one wa y acc ord ingas the y are un ive rsa l pr in ciples ;and in ano the r way ac co rding as the y are cer tain thi ngs in thems elv es. Howe ver , prin cip les of thi s kind , altho ugh in thems elv esmo st know ab le, are not the most knowable in rel atio n to our inte llec t. For thos e thi ngs which are mos t knowab le acc ord ingto nat ure are the leas t knowab le to us . 15 No w, tho se th ings are mo st know - abl e in thems elv eswh ich have mo st be ing , bec aus eea ch th ing is knowabl eins ofa r as it ha s bein g. But tho se thi ngs havemost be ing wh ich are mos t in ac t. Th ere for e, suc h thi ngs are mo st know ab le in thems elve s. Ye t the y are the lea st knowab le to us , bec ause the pr inc ipl eof our kno wle dge is i t . i rsals cau ed , t d. ri ciple" s. 3 r i ciples l r ing e, i sals tion. t t r t ing insic • l s i . , t ledge - icati n. i rsals ication • tit t t of things. It is im• JJos i le t i g i ated uni rsal nce, - t c f i r i . sal is . nsequently, it would t t nce , and this t , nce fir t st nce, ., tes, r h i ing. i e t ted nces ri ciples s - l t i t elves, idered in t : ing r i rsal i ciples; rdi g things selves. r, principles i d, although i t selve ble, t the m st able i l t. r t t le ing le t . ' , t i gs • l i selves which have mo t being, becau e each thing is knowable a ha being. B have which . f re, things a able elves. Yet t le , iple l dge i t

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13 In V Metap h., lec t. 13, n. 936. In VII Metap h., lec t. 13, n. 1572. 15 /n/ Phy sico rum , lec t. 1, n. 7. I h., li[n, il h., . ' I I si ru , .

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1 6In II Me tap h., lect . 1, n. 285. 17 In IV Me tap h., lect . 1, n. 532. l [ , h., h., . t / . t

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